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CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 01 OF 05 BANGKOK 000263

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL : 02/02/2019

TAGS: PGOV PTER MARR MOPS PINS PHUM TH

SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR SENIOR MILITARY VISITORS TO

THAILAND DURING COBRA GOLD

Classified By: Ambassador Eric G. John, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

1.1. (C) Summary. Coming visits by component commanders, and
other senior leaders of various U.S. military commands will
afford a chance to affirm the United States Government's
commitment to working with a democratically elected Thai
government, to promoting a continued strong bilateral
relationship, and to affirming our support for important
areas of our mil-mil relationship such as the Defense Reform
Management Study (DRMS), Cobra Gold, and Thailand's
deployment of peacekeepers to Darfur. End Summary.

ENDURING BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP

12. (SBU) The Thai public closely watched our recent
Presidential election, and the results received much scrutiny
regarding the potential impact on U.S. -Thai relations. Thai
government officials have expressed strong interest in
hearing assessments of the transition to a new administration
and U.S. policy towards Southeast Asia. We have stressed to
the Thai we do not anticipate significant changes in our
bilateral relationship due to the history and strength of our
alliance and the nature of long-standing U.S. -Thai security,
economic, and cultural bonds. However, the changing
generations in both Thailand and the U.S. require both sides
work hard to maintain the vibrancy in the relationship.

THAI POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT - YELLOW AND RED

13. (C) The December dissolution of the People's Power Party
(PPP), which led to the fall of the government of former PM
Somchai and installation of the Democrat-led coalition
government of Prime Minister Abhisit Vejajjiva, has appeared
to quiet, at least temporarily, the political situation.

Gone are the street protests by the anti-government People ' s
Alliance for Democracy (PAD) which shut down Bangkok's
airports for a week and occupied the formal seat of
government for over three months. But the basic deep split
in society and the body politic remains, with the traditional
royalist elite, urban middle class, Bangkok, and the south on
one side ( "yellow" in shorthand) and the political allies of
ex-PM Thaksin, currently a fugitive abroad, along with
largely rural supporters in the North and Northeast ("red")

on the other.

1.4 . (C) Prime Minister Abhisit is off to a reasonably good
start in his first month in office, but his government faces
significant policy challenges given the current economic
situation in Thailand and globally. Abhisit and the
Democrats also have to contend with former Prime Minister
Thaksin Shinawatra's continued attempts to influence the
political environment from abroad and to recover assets of
his that were seized by the government. Moreover,
demonstrations by United Front of Democracy for Dictatorship
"redshirts" loyal to the former PM will test the new
government .

15. (C) Calling for new elections would not appear to be a
viable solution to political divide, and political turmoil
could very well persist for years. The steadiest figure on
the political stage over the past months has been Army
Commander Anupong Paochinda, who steadfastly rejected
pressure from both sides for the army to intervene in the
political stalemate, either to conduct a coup d'etat or to
clear the streets of protesters. We continue to stress to
Thai interlocutors the negative ramifications of a coup and
the need for all parties to avoid violence and respect
democratic norms within the framework of the constitution and
rule of law.

16. (C) King Bhumibol turned 81 on December 5. Many had
anticipated his commentary for his annual address to the
nation on the eve of his birthday; his address was canceled,

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however, after he fell ill with bronchitis. (Note: The King
was hospitalized for a period of weeks in late 2007 for
appeared to be a minor stroke. End note.) The Palace has
since announced the King's recovery; as of late, he has been
shown on television more frequently in meetings with both
foreigners and Thais. The King's passing, whenever that may
be, will shock Thailand. Crown Prince Va j iralongkorn is the
King's designated heir. However, the current King's enormous
personal prestige, the lack of a precedent for royal
succession during the modern era (King Bhumibol has been on
the throne since 1946), and changing sentiment about the
proper role of the institution in the 21st century suggest
that the transition will be difficult.

THAI ECONOMY STRUGGLES TO OVERCOME CHALLENGES

1.7 . (SBU) Over the past few years, Thailand's economy has been
growing at a moderate pace, though the long-running political
uncertainty has stifled domestic investment, hamstrung
government stimulus programs, and kept Thailand from keeping
up with other ASEAN nations. The worldwide economic slowdown
of recent months has hit Thailand particularly hard as
exports, the one bright spot in GDP growth, have fallen,
causing growth forecasts for 2009 to be ratcheted down from

4% to less than 2%. This dreary scenario was made much worse
by the November airport closures, which devastated Thailand's
large tourism and convention industries just at the beginning
of the high season.

1.8. (SBU) Historically, Thailand's economy has hummed along
unaffected by frequent political squabbling, but the recent
willingness of political actors to take actions that clearly
damage the economy and the nation's international image is
changing that tenet. Thailand's largest foreign investors,
Japanese in particular, have expressed dismay at the new turn
in events. The full effect of the airport closures has not
yet shown up in the data, but FDI (especially from the U.S.)
was already trending down for 2008. The new government is
well aware of these challenges, has made an extraordinary
effort to put together an economically reasonable and
politically savvy economic stimulus package, and is reaching
out to the foreign business community to re-built Thailand's
image as a good place to do business.

IMPORTANT MILITARY ENGAGEMENT PROGRAM, ACCESS

19 . (SBU) The long-standing U.S.-Thai military partnership
provides the U.S. with unique benefits. These include
distinctive force projection options, the possibility to
conduct training exercises that are nearly impossible to
match elsewhere in Asia, the opportunity to advance U.S.
strategic goals, access to military leaders in a nation that
is trying to strengthen democratic institutions, a willing
participant in international peacekeeping operations, and a
partner in medical research which has produced widely-used
vaccines .

1.10. (C) Thailand's willingness to allow the United States to
use Utapao Naval Air Station as the hub for our regional
assistance program was key to making the 2004 tsunami and the
2008 Cyclone Nargis relief operations successful. While
those high-profile relief operations highlighted publicly the
value of access to Utapao, the air base is used regularly for
flights in support of critical U.S. military operations to
strategic areas of the world. Thailand also provides valued
port access with U.S. naval vessels making calls, primarily
at Laem Chabang and Sattahip, over forty times per year for
exercises and visits.

COBRA GOLD AND THE MILITARY EXERCISE PROGRAM

11.1 1. (C) By means of access to good military base
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infrastructure and large areas to conduct unrestricted
operations, Thailand gives the U.S. military a platform for
exercises unique in Asia. Thai leaders are far more willing
to host multinational exercises than are other countries in
Asia. Unlike Japan, which only hosts annual bilateral
exercises due to legal prohibitions over collective security,
or the Philippines, where planning for multinational
exercises has been difficult, or Australia, which refuses to
multilateralize Tandem Thrust, the Thai government encourages
multinational exercises as a way to show regional leadership.

This has allowed us to use exercises in Thailand to further
key U.S. objectives, such as supporting Japan's growing
military role in Asia and engaging the Indonesian and
Singaporean militaries.

11.12 . (C) Cobra Gold, the capstone event of our exercise
program, is PACOM's largest annual multi-lateral exercise and
for 28 years has served to strengthen our relations with
Thailand, highlight our commitment to Southeast Asia, and
provide exceptional training opportunities for our troops.

The event has evolved over the years and now facilitates
important objectives such as promoting a greater role in the
Asian Pacific region for Japan and Singapore and
re-establishing a partner role with Indonesia. Cobra Gold is
key to building partner nation capacity in humanitarian
assistance and disaster relief, especially at a time when
U.S. forces face other global commitments. We have also been
able to incorporate into Cobra Gold a robust Global
Peacekeeping Operations Initiative (GPOI) event with active
participation of Indonesia and Singapore. Our other primary
exercises with the Thai military are CARAT and COPE TIGER.

DEFENSE REFORM

11.13. (C) We have been working closely with the Royal Thai
Armed Forces Headquarters (RTARF) on the U.S. -funded Defense
Resource Management System (DRMS) project which will help
rationalize the Thai military's procurement and other
resource needs. We use every appropriate opportunity to
emphasize our desire to work closely with the Thai military
leadership to accelerate DRMS process. Phase II of this
process will begin the first week of March following the

ASEAN summit scheduled for Thailand.

PEACEKEEPING EFFORTS

1[14. (C) Thailand has been an active contributor in
peacekeeping missions, best known for leading forces in the
UNTAET mission in East Timor. The RTARF has been a close
partner for us as the Thai government continues preparations
to deploy a battalion of peacekeeping troops to Darfur as
UNAMID. With deployment currently scheduled for mid-2009, we
have continued to underscore to the leadership of the Thai
military that we stand ready to assist the Thai again where
possible .

SOUTHERN THAILAND: SECURITY AND JUSTICE

1[15. (C) The Thai military, since General Anupong became Army
Commander, has taken a more assertive role in trying to quell
the ethnic Malay Muslim ethno-nationalist insurgency in
southern Thailand, a region that has witnessed episodic
violence since its incorporation into Siam/Thailand in 1902.
Regional violence has claimed more than 3000 lives since
January 2004, when the violence began to escalate. The root
causes of the insurgency -- government neglect, human rights
abuses, and a lack of social justice, combined with a desire
for some form of self-determination, have not been addressed
by any Thai government to this point.

t_16. (C) While the Thai military has so far focused mostly on

trying to resolve the difficult security situation in the

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South, with increased tactical success in security sweeps,
occasional abuses by security forces have added to the sense
of grievance and lack of justice by the local populace.

Efforts by civilian government ministries to solve the root
causes of injustice and the feeling of disenfranchisement by
the Thai-Malay majority in the three southern provinces have
so far lagged. While the Abhisit government appears set to
adopt an integrated government approach to solving the
insurgency with budgetary and policy decision making
responsibility possibly transferred to the Office of the
Prime Minister, it remains unclear how the civil-military
dynamic will change.

11_17. (C) The RTG has made clear its hesitancy in accepting any
direct USG role in the South. The Embassy maintains a
three-pronged focus to improve our military cooperation in
order to address the violence in the South:

1) Using our exercise and training program to improve the
professional and operational skills of the Royal Thai Armed
Forces, especially the Thai Army;

2 ) Helping the Thai break down stovepipes between the Thai
military, police forces, and civilian agencies;

3 ) Doing everything we can to ensure the Thai respect
international human rights norms as they counter the violence.

BORDER CONFLICT WITH CAMBODIA

11_18. (C) Thai Foreign Minister Kasit Piromya 1 s January 26
visit to Phnom Penh produced encouraging statements by all
sides regarding the border dispute that is centered on
overlapping claims to territory adjacent to Preah Vihear
temple. The next round of talks under the auspices of the
Foreign Ministry-led Joint Border Commission (JBC) are
scheduled for February 2 , and the two nations 1 defense
ministers are scheduled to meet February 6 to discuss the
redeployment of soldiers stationed at the temple. Despite
continued talks between Thailand and Cambodia, we are not
optimistic for quick resolution to the dispute. Difficult
issues lay at the heart of the matter, and political conflict
in Bangkok may make tough decisions more difficult for the
Thai government. We continue to stress to the Thai

interlocutors that the dispute should be resolved peacefully
and bilaterally.

REFUGEE /MIGRANT CONCERNS: LAO HMONG AND ROHINGYA

11_19. (C) Thailand has hosted millions of refugees since the

IndoChina wars and currently has more than 150,000 refugees
from Burma in camps along the Thai-Burma border. The RTARF
has the lead on resolving the difficult problem of the
thousands of Hmong from Laos who arrived in 2006-2007 seeking
resettlement in the U.S.; many of them likely would not
qualify for refugee status and will be returned to Laos.
However, the Thai government has so far failed to set up a
transparent screening process for the Hmong currently in a
camp in Petchaboon province; we believe that a portion of the
group may have a legitimate claim to refugee status and could
face harsh treatment by the Lao government if returned. Some
are former fighters (or their descendants) allied with the
U.S. against the communist Pathet Lao during the IndoChina
wars . We want to take every opportunity to underscore to the
RTARF the importance of transparently handling the Lao Hmong
cases .

11_2 0. (C) Media reports in recent weeks over Thai actions
regarding Rohingya "boat people" have resulted in strong
criticism of the RTG and its policy toward groups that
attempt to enter Thailand, primarily from Burma. Rohingya
typically cross from Burma's Northern Rakhine state into
Bangladesh to board vessels bound for Malaysia. This year
many have instead found their way to the Ranong area in
Thailand, the Andaman Islands of India, and Aceh Province,
Indonesia. According to various reports, several hundred

BANGKOK 00000263 005 OF 005

Rohingya went missing from at least one vessel encountered by
the Indian coast guard off Port Blair in the Andaman Islands
in early January. Survivors have alleged being towed out to
sea and being abandoned by Thai military or marine police
vessels .

1I_21. (C) A recent visit to the Ranong area by Embassy Ref Coord
suggests to us that two loosely defined groupings of unpaid
civilian defense volunteers drawn from fishing villages were
involved in the alleged mistreatment of the Rohingya, but
that they received general policy direction and some
financial support from the Thai Army-led local Internal
Security Operations Center. It remains unclear what boats
may have been involved in towing the Rohingya back out to
sea. We continue to stress to our contacts in the Thai
government that Thailand should provide access for UNHCR to
Rohingya boat people who reach Thai shores, and that
push-outs to sea are not consistent with basic humanitarian
principles .

THE INCREASING ROLE OF CHINA

112 2. (C) Thai leaders continue to develop closer relations
with China while simultaneously emphasizing the vital role of
the U.S. in the region. While Thai military links with the
United States are deeper and far more apparent than Sino-Thai
links, China's growing influence in Thailand and Southeast
Asia is evident in business, the arts, the media, and the
military. The Thai military has a range of Chinese weapons
systems in its arsenal; the PLA Navy is interested in closer
links with the Thai navy, and China has worked with Thailand
to improve air defense equipment provided to Thailand in the
late 1980 's. In 2007 and 2008, Thai and Chinese special
forces conducted joint exercises, and other mil-to-mil
exchanges have expanded in recent years, as has the number of
bilateral military VIP visits. A yet to be disclosed marine
corps exercise between China and Thailand near the eastern
seaboard port of Sattahip in the April-May timeframe
highlights the continuing push by China to expand their
mil-to-mil relations with Thailand's military.

JOHN